World War III? Not Now—Perhaps Later

Recently, mainstream media outlets have portrayed the world as if it were on the brink of World War III. Sensational headlines have proliferated: “The World at Boiling Point,” “The Great War Is Near,” and “A Small Step Toward Global Catastrophe.” However, upon closer examination and through a lens of strategic reasoning, it becomes evident that the world is not yet teetering on the edge of destruction—at least not for now.

In the realm of international relations, states do not act on impulse. States are rational actors—decision-makers grounded in cost-benefit calculations, national capabilities, and bargaining positions. Even grand ambitions, such as the "Greater Israel" project advocated by extremist Zionist factions or the "Make America Great Again" slogan touted by MAGA supporters in the United States, are ultimately constrained by the iron law of political realism.

World War I and II were not the products of mass hysteria among major powers; they were the outcomes of strategic miscalculations—fatal ones. Germany initiated both wars under the belief that the risks were worthwhile and that victory would be swift and decisive. Yet both conflicts ended in crushing defeat, stemming from a gross misjudgment.

Today’s global situation bears a striking resemblance. Israel is operating under a risk-seeking logic, viewing the present moment as a strategic window to exert pressure on Iran: Hezbollah and the Houthis are weakening, Bashar al-Assad has lost legitimacy in Syria, and Iran is, by most measures, in a vulnerable position.

Thus, for Israel, the current moves against Iran are not merely acts of aggression, but strategic opportunities to solidify regional dominance. Israel’s initial strikes have successfully targeted key figures within Iran’s military establishment. Nonetheless, despite its ambitions, Israel remains a regional—not global—power. It still requires the United States to execute a full-scale offensive. Without American support, Israel’s military capacity is limited. Should a prolonged war with Iran ensue without U.S. backing, Israel would be unable to sustain it.

Iran, too, has demonstrated strategic restraint. When attacked, it retaliates—but within calculated limits. Its strikes on Tel Aviv were not designed to destroy Israel, but to restore the principle of mutual deterrence. Iran is acutely aware that an overly aggressive response would provide Israel and the United States with a pretext for all-out war.

At the heart of this geopolitical tension lies the United States. Though narratives frequently suggest that “America is controlled by Israel,” the reality of geopolitical practice tells a different story: the United States plays a far more dominant role. Israel may lobby and exert pressure, but the final decision rests in Washington.

This reality became starkly evident when MAGA figure Steve Bannon openly rebuked Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, saying: “Who in the hell are you?” Even as a staunch pro-Israel advocate, Bannon maintained that the U.S. should not blindly follow Tel Aviv’s every demand.

For American strategists, the true focal point is not the Middle East—it is China. Donald Trump himself acknowledged this. While he does not object to Israel weakening Iran, he remains cautious not to be dragged too deeply into the conflict.

The operation targeting Iran’s nuclear facilities—dubbed Midnight Hammer—is a manifestation of this balancing act. The strike was executed, success was proclaimed, and a diplomatic exit was offered. Iran responded symbolically by targeting empty sites, preserving its honor without escalating the conflict.

This is what scholars describe as a coordinated war dance—a scenario in which both conflicting parties engage in controlled confrontation, each seeking to avoid large-scale war while preserving their respective images.

Even in the event of a full-scale American assault on Iran, such an action would not necessarily trigger World War III. Why? Because a world war requires the involvement of other major powers—namely Russia and China.

Thus far, both have adopted a passive stance. When Assad's regime in Syria faced collapse, Russia merely observed. When Armenia was attacked by Azerbaijan—despite their mutual defense agreement—Russia remained silent. Should Iran be attacked, it is highly probable that Russia would likewise abstain and begin adjusting to a potential regime change.

China’s posture is similar. It may extend covert support to Iran but is unlikely to become directly involved. In fact, China arguably benefits from U.S. entanglement in Middle Eastern conflicts, as such distractions divert American attention away from the Indo-Pacific—the principal theater of future global rivalry.

Yet it must be emphasized: the current situation is not the end. It is merely a temporary phase of de-escalation. Israel still maintains escalatory dominance and can initiate a new phase of conflict whenever it deems necessary.

Conclusion:

It is time to move past the reflexive panic that labels every major conflict as the onset of “World War III.” The world is not that simplistic. We are not standing at the threshold of a world war; rather, we are navigating a new phase of the Cold War—one marked by more sophisticated actors, interests, and strategies. Let us, therefore, learn, understand, and use our terminology with greater precision.